Automatically detecting software vulnerabilities is an important problem that has attracted much attention. However, existing vulnerability detectors still cannot achieve the vulnerability detection capability and locating precision that would warrant their adoption for real-world use. In this paper, we present Vulnerability Deep learning-based Locator (VulDeeLocator), a deep learning-based fine-grained vulnerability detector, for C programs with source code. VulDeeLocator advances the state-of-the-art by simultaneously achieving a high detection capability and a high locating precision. When applied to three real-world software products, VulDeeLocator detects four vulnerabilities that are not reported in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD); among these four vulnerabilities, three are not known to exist in these products until now, but the other one has been "silently" patched by the vendor when releasing newer versions of the vulnerable product. The core innovations underlying VulDeeLocator are (i) the leverage of intermediate code to accommodate semantic information that cannot be conveyed by source code-based representations, and (ii) the concept of granularity refinement for precisely pinning down locations of vulnerabilities.
INTRODUCTION
S OFTWARE vulnerabilities are a major cause of cyber attacks. Unfortunately, vulnerabilities are prevalent as evidenced by the steady increase of vulnerabilities reported by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [1] . One important approach towards eliminating vulnerabilities is to design vulnerability detectors to detect (and patch) them. An ideal vulnerability detector should simultaneously achieve a high detection capability and a high locating precision (i.e., precisely pinning down the vulnerable lines of code).
A popular family of vulnerability detectors is based on static analysis. These detectors can be divided into code similarity-based ones and pattern-based ones. Code similaritybased detectors [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] can detect vulnerabilities caused by code cloning, and can achieve a high locating precision when they indeed detect vulnerabilities. How-ever, they incur high false-negatives (i.e., low detection capability) when applied to detect vulnerabilities that are not caused by code cloning. Pattern-based detectors can be further divided into rule-based ones and machine learningbased ones. Rule-based detectors [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] can identify the vulnerable lines of code when they indeed correctly detect vulnerabilities, but often incur a low detection capability (because of their high false-positives and high false-negatives). Moreover, they require human analysts to define vulnerability detection rules. Machine learning-based detectors use vulnerability patterns for detection, where the patterns are learned from analyst-defined feature representation of vulnerable programs [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] . However, these detectors cannot achieve a high locating precision because they operate at a coarse granularity, typically at the function level [12] .
The recent development in machine learning-based vulnerability detection is to use deep learning [17] , [18] and operate at a finer, or "program slice", level. These detectors also can relieve the problem of manual-feature definition, which has received further attention recently [19] , [20] , [21] . However, these detectors still offer inadequate detection capability and inadequate locating precision.
To see their inadequate detection capability, we observe that the state-of-the-art detector [18] , despite its improvement upon [17] , reportedly achieves an F1-measure of 86.0%, a false-positive rate of 10.1%, and a false-negative rate of 12.2% (see Table 4 in Section 6). This inadequacy can be attributed to the detector's incapability in (i) capturing the relations between semantically-related statements and (ii) taking advantage of control flows and the variable defineuse relations. To see (i), we observe that programs often contain many user-defined and/or system header files (e.g., .h) for defining types and macros. Analyzing source code alone, as is done in [17] , [18] , cannot associate the uses of types and macros in program files (e.g., .c) to their arXiv:2001.02350v1 [cs.CR] 8 Jan 2020 definitions in header files. This is not surprising because source code analysis tools may not even be able to correctly identify the relations between the definition and the use of macros and global variables in a same program file, as what will be shown in Section 6.6. To see (ii), we observe that source code is not in the Static Single Assignment (SSA) form, which assures that each variable is defined-andthen-used and is assigned exactly once [22] . That is, source code-based representations do not fully expose control flows and/or variable define-use relations [23] , and some semantic information cannot be captured by vulnerability detectors that leverage source code-based representations [17] , [18] .
To see their inadequate locating precision, we observe that although they operate on program slices (which are finergrained than functions), a program slice can have many lines of code. For example, according to the dataset published in [18] , 78.7% of their program slices have at least 10 lines of code and 47.8% of them have at least 20 lines, indicating a low locating precision. That is, coarse-grained vulnerability detection is merely a pre-step for vulnerability assessment because it cannot precisely pinpoint vulnerabilities [24] .
The preceding inadequacies of state-of-the-art vulnerability detectors motivates the need of detectors that can achieve a high detection capability and a high locating precision simultaneously. Our contributions. In this paper we make two contributions. First, we propose Vulnerability Deep learningbased Locator (VulDeeLocator), a deep learning-based finegrained vulnerability detector, for C programs with source code. VulDeeLocator can simultaneously achieve a high detection capability and a high locating precision. When compared with the state-of-the-art detector [18] , VulDeeLocator offers (i) an 11.0%, 9.6%, and 8.2% improvement in the vulnerability detection F1-measure, false-positive rate, and false-negative rate, respectively; and (ii) a 3.9X improvement in the vulnerability locating precision. When applied to three real-world software products, it detects four vulnerabilities that are not reported in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [25] . Among these four vulnerabilities, three are not known to exist in these products until now and have been notified to the vendors, and the other one has been "silently" patched by the vendor when releasing newer versions of the vulnerable product. VulDeeLocator has two innovations:
• It leverages program intermediate code to define program slices for vulnerability detection. Such slices can accommodate semantic information that cannot be conveyed by source code-based representations, such as the aforementioned (i) relations between the definitions of types and macros and their uses and (ii) control flows and variable define-use relations.
• It leverages the idea of granularity refinement introduced in this paper to make the granularity of detector outputs (e.g., 3 lines of code) finer than the granularity of detector inputs (e.g., 32 lines of code).
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use intermediate code to design machine learning-based vulnerability detectors, despite that intermediate code has been leveraged in rule-based vulnerability detectors [8] , [9] . Moreover, we introduce new guiding principles for vulnerability candidate representations and new requirements for fine-grained vulnerability detectors. These guiding principles and requirements would guide the design of tailored fine-grained vulnerability detectors. We demonstrate the feasibility of granularity refinement via a novel variant of the Bidirectional Recurrent Neural Network (BRNN), dubbed "BRNN for vulnerability detection and locating" (BRNN-vdl).
Second, we prepare a dataset in the Lower Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) intermediate code with accompanying program source code. This dataset is motivated by the need of evaluating the effectiveness of VulDeeLocator; it contains 119,782 vulnerability candidates in intermediate code, among which 30,201 are vulnerable and 89,581 are not vulnerable. It is not trivial to prepare this dataset because we need user-defined and system header files for generating intermediate code. In order for other researchers to use the dataset, we have made it available at https://github.com/ VulDeeLocator/VulDeeLocator. We will publish the source code used in our experiments on the same website.
Paper organization. Section 2 discusses the basic ideas and definitions underlying VulDeeLocator. Section 3 presents an overview of VulDeeLocator. Section 4 describes how VulDeeLocator leverages intermediate code and Section 5 describes how VulDeeLocator pinpoints vulnerabilities. Section 6 presents our experiments and results. Section 7 discusses limitations of the present study. Section 8 reviews the related prior work. Section 9 concludes the present paper.
BASIC IDEAS AND DEFINITIONS

Basic Ideas
The basic idea underlying VulDeeLocator is to extract some tokens (e.g., identifiers, operators, constants, and keywords) from program source code according to a given set of vulnerability syntax characteristics, and then leverage the intermediate code of the same program to accommodate the statements in the intermediate code that are semantically related to those tokens. These statements are encoded into vectors (which are then used to train a neural network) or are the input to the trained neural network for vulnerability detection. The output in the testing phase is finer-grained (i.e., shorter or smaller) than the corresponding input. Figure 1 illustrates these basic ideas, showing that in the testing phase an input of d intermediate code statements leads to a refined output of two source code statements indicating where the vulnerability is.
Source code
Vulnerability syntax characteristics The idea of leveraging intermediate code deserves more explanation. Figure 2 describes a buffer overflow vulnerability candidate related to pointer "data" (Line 2). However, the candidate cannot accommodate the control flow of conditional operator "N<m?N:99" (Line 14), despite that this kind of semantic information is important for vulnerability detection (because control flow can expose vulnerabilities [26] ). Source code-based representations cannot convey this kind of semantic information because source code is not in the SSA form [22] , which assures that each variable is assigned exactly once. These limitations of source code-based representations can be overcome by intermediate code.
Intermediate code
sc 2 ------- ... ic 1' ------- ... ic d' -------
Source program
A source code-based vulnerability candidate related to "data" (Line 2) 2 also shows another example, where the macro definition identifier "N" (highlighted with boxes) cannot be identified as "100" when using source code-based representation to derive the vulnerability candidate related to "data". This is because source code parsing may not associate the use of macros and global variables to their definitions in the same program file, let alone associating the use of types and macros in a program file (e.g., .c) to their definitions in another file (i.e., header file). As we will see later, this kind of semantic information can be captured by intermediate code.
Formal Definitions
In order to make the aforementioned ideas precise, we need formal definitions. We start with reviewing: Definition 1 (source program). A source program P is a set of program files p 1 , . . . , p n , denoted by P = {p 1 , . . . , p n }. A program file p i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) consists of a set of functions and possibly some outside type and/or macro definitions (i.e., these type and/or macro definitions are not specified inside, but are specified outside, those functions). We denote these functions and outside type and macro definitions by f i,1 , . . . , f i,mi and therefore denote a program file by p i = {f i,1 , . . . , f i,mi }. A function or outside type and/or macro definition
is a sequence of tokens, denoted by s i,j,k = (t i,j,k,1 , . . . , t i,j,k,ξ i,j,k ), where t i,j,k,l (1 ≤ l ≤ ξ i,j,k ) is a token (e.g., identifier, operator, constant, and keyword).
It is intuitive that vulnerabilities exhibit some syntax characteristics that can be leveraged to identify some pieces of code (i.e., program slices) as initial candidates for vulnerability detection [17] , [18] . Vulnerability syntax characteristics can be represented via some appropriate data structures (e.g., Abstract Syntax Trees or ASTs), which allow one to extract pieces of source code that match these characteristics. Regardless of the representation of such characteristics, we can use H = {h 1 , ..., h η } to represent a set of η vulnerability syntax characteristics. We can use a characteristic h q (1 ≤ q ≤ η) to extract pieces of source code as syntax-based vulnerability candidates, which are the starting point for vulnerability detection, leading to: Definition 2. (source code-and Syntax-based Vulnerability Candidate or sSyVC [18] ) Consider a source program P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } where a program file p i = {f i,1 , . . . , f i,mi }, a function or outside type and/or macro definition f i,j = s i,j,1 , . . . , s i,j,ri,j , and a statement s i,j,k = (t i,j,k,1 , . . . , t i,j,k,ξ i,j,k,z ). Given a set of vulnerability syntax characteristics H = {h 1 , . . . , h η }, a sSyVC y i,j,k,z is one or multiple consecutive tokens in statement s i,j,k that match some vulnerability syntax
Since we propose leveraging program intermediate code to capture semantic information, we need to define: . . , f i,mi . We denote by
is the intermediate code of a function or outside type and/or macro definition f i,j , denoted by a sequence of statements f i,j = (s i,j,1 , . . . , s i,j,r i,j ).
Given sSyVCs extracted from a program and the intermediate code of the same program, we can now define: The iSeVC corresponding to sSyVC y i,j,k,z is a sequence of statements s a1,b1,c1 , . . . , s aρ i,j,k,z ,b ψ i,j,k,z ,c i,j,k,z in intermediate code P of source program P ; these statements are data or control dependent [27] on y i,j,k,z , denoted by e i,j,k,z = (s a1,b1,c1 , . . . , s aρ i,j,k,z ,b ψ i,j,k,z ,c i,j,k,z ). That is, the iSeVC corresponding to sSyVC y i,j,k,z is a program slice of y i,j,k,z in the intermediate code of program P . Figure 3 highlights the structure of VulDeeLocator, which can be instantiated with specific intermediate code representations and deep learning models. The input to VulDee-Locator is the source code of training programs for learning a neural network or target programs for vulnerability detection. More specifically, the learning-phase input includes source code of C programs, which may or may not be vulnerable. The source code of C programs should satisfy the following: (i) they can be compiled into (platformindependent) intermediate code, such as the LLVM intermediate code [28] , [22] ; and (ii) the vulnerable programs are accompanied by descriptions on the locations of their vulnerabilities, which will be leveraged to locate vulnerabilities in target programs.
OVERVIEW OF VULDEELOCATOR
At a high level, VulDeeLocator has two components. The first component leverages intermediate code representation of training programs and target programs as follows:
•
Step I: Extracting sSyVCs from the source code, namely pieces of code that bear some vulnerability syntax characteristic(s).
Step II: Generating iSeVCs from the intermediate code according to sSyVCs.
The second component uses the intermediate code-based representation to detect and locate vulnerabilities as follows:
Step III: Labeling iSeVCs extracted from training programs as vulnerable or not and vulnerability locations.
Step IV: Training a neural network model from the vector representations of the iSeVCs and their labels.
Step V: Using the trained neural network model to detect and locate vulnerabilities in target programs.
Note that the learning phase corresponds to Steps I-IV and the testing (i.e., detection) phase corresponds to Steps I, II, and V.
INTERMEDIATE CODE-BASED VULNERABILITY CANDIDATE REPRESENTATION
Guiding Principles for Vulnerability Candidate Representation
It is intuitive that vulnerability detectors should accommodate program semantic information, highlighting the importance of identifying effective vulnerability candidate representations. For this purpose, we propose using the following principles to guide the identification of effective vulnerability candidate representation. functions, meaning that effective vulnerability candidate representations should accommodate, and further preserve the order of, those semantically-related statements, even if they belong to different functions.
Extracting sSyVCs
As defined above, a sSyVC is a piece of code that is extracted from a program according to some vulnerability syntax characteristic(s). There may be many approaches to obtaining vulnerability syntax characteristics for vulnerability detection. As a concrete example, we leverage the syntax characteristics of known vulnerabilities and represent these characteristics via Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs) of the program source code (more precisely, attributes of the nodes on ASTs). This will ease the extraction of sSyVCs according to vulnerability syntax characteristics. We define the following four kinds of vulnerability syntax characteristics, which are mentioned here because they will be referred in our examples.
• Library/API Function Call (FC): This vulnerability syntax characteristic is that the type of a node on the AST is function call, the function name matches a library/API function name, and at least one argument of the function call is a variable.
• Array Definition (AD): This vulnerability syntax characteristic is that the type of a node on the AST is variable declaration and the code corresponding to the node contains characters '[' and ']'.
• Pointer Definition (PD): This vulnerability syntax characteristic is that the type of a node on the AST is variable declaration and the code corresponding to the node contains character ' * '.
• Arithmetic Expression (AE): This vulnerability syntax characteristic is that the type of a node on the AST is assignment expression and the node has at least one variable at the right-hand side of the assignment expression.
Given the source code of a program, one can generate its AST(s), from which sSyVCs can be extracted by identifying the nodes whose type and code match some vulnerability syntax characteristics. We reiterate that these syntax characteristics themselves are far from adequate in detecting vulnerabilities because they cannot accommodate the due semantic information that is related to vulnerabilities. Figure 4 (a) is an example showing the sSyVCs (highlighted by boxes) in a program: sSyVCs related to the FC-kind vulnerability syntax characteristics include "printf" (Line 6), "memset" (Lines 14 and 23), and "memmove" (Line 25); sSyVCs related to the AD-kind vulnerability syntax characteristics include "dataBuffer" (Line 10) and "source" (Line 11); sSyVCs related to the PD-kind vulnerability syntax characteristics include "data" (Line 2); and sSyVCs related to the AE-kind vulnerability syntax characteristics include "data=dataBuffer-8" (Line 19).
Generating iSeVCs
In order to generate iSeVCs, we propose focusing on the LLVM intermediate code, namely the LLVM Intermediate
Output
Step I: Extracting sSyVCs from the source code
Step IV: Training a neural network model
Step V: Detecting and locating vulnerabilities in target programs
Step II: Generating iSeVCs from the intermediate code
Step x i8]* @.str, i32 0, i32 0) br i1 %2, label %3, label %safe_return %4 = load i8*, i8** @data, align 4 %5 = call i32 (i8*, ...) @printf(i8* getelementptr inbounds
i32 0, i32 0 %14 = getelementp tr inbou nds i8, i8* %13, i32 -8 store i8* %14, i8** @data, align 4 ... %16 = getelementp tr inbou nds [100 x i8], [100 x i8]* %2, i32 0, i32 0 call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i32(i8* %16, i8 67, i32 99, i32 1, i1 false) … call vo id @printLine() } @data = common global i8* null, align 4 ... Representation (LLVM IR) [28] , because it is widely used for C programs. • Generate the dependence graph by computing the control dependencies and data dependencies from the linked LLVM bitcode file.
• Slice the dependence graph according to each sSyVC [23] such that (i) in an LLVM slice, each local variable is represented as a numeric value with prefix "%", and (ii) for each function in the LLVM slice, the numeric value for the first local variable is "1", and the numeric value is increased by 1 for each local variable thereafter.
As an example, we mention that tools like dg [30] can generate LLVM slices corresponding to sSyVCs. Figure 4 (c) Algorithm 1 Generating iSeVCs from the intermediate code
Input:
A source program P = {p 1 , . . . , pn}; a set Y = {y i,j,k,z } of sSyVCs Output:
The set of iSeVCs E 1: E ← ∅; {the set of iSeVCs} 2: P ← ∅; {the set of LLVM bitcode files corresponding to source program files in P } 3: B ← ∅; {the set of linked LLVM bitcode files for P } 4: for each p i ∈ P do 5:
Use Clang to compile p i to an LLVM bitcode file p i ; 6: P ← P ∪ {p i }; 7: end for 8: Group the LLVM bitcode files in P by dependency relationships; 9: for each group Gµ do 10:
Link the LLVM bitcode files in Gµ to an LLVM bitcode file b µ ; 11:
B ← B ∪ {b µ }; 12: end for 13: for each y i,j,k,z ∈ Y do 14:
for
if the bitcode file corresponding to p i is linked to b µ then 16:
Generate the LLVM slice e i,j,k,z corresponding to y i,j,k,z from b µ ; 17:
end for 20: end for 21: for each e i,j,k,z ∈ E do 22:
for each function f γ called by function f α do 23:
The statements in e i,j,k,z of f γ are appended to the statement (in f α ) calling function f γ ; 24:
Modify each numeric value with prefix "%" in the appended statements to a new numeric value that has not been used in f α ; 25: end for 26: end for 27: return E;
illustrates that the LLVM slice corresponding to sSyVC "data".
Finally, iSeVCs (i.e., program statements that are semantically related to sSyVCs) are generated as follows (Lines [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . For each function f γ that is called by function f α , the statements in the LLVM slice of function f γ are appended to the statement (in function f α ) that calls function f γ . This is to preserve the order of statements that possibly belong to different functions but are related to each other (because of some control dependency and/or data dependency). Figure 4 (d) illustrates that the statements in the LLVM slice of function printLine, which is highlighted by the dashed box, are appended to the statement "call void @print-Line()" in the calling function main. In order to avoid assigning the same numeric value to different local variables in the LLVM slices of different functions, each numeric value with prefix "%" (i.e., local variable) in the appended statements is modified to a new numeric value that has not been used in the calling function. In the example shown in Figure 4 (d), the local variable "%1" in the LLVM slice of function printLine is modified to "%17" because "16" is the last assigned numeric value in function main, which is shown in Figure 4 (c).
Remark. The inadequacy of source code-based representations in conveying semantic information, which is shown in the two examples discussed in Section 2.1, is overcome by the use of intermediate code. Specifically, the iSeVC shown in Figure 4 (d) involves statements "%6=icmp slt i32 100, %5" and "%7=select i1 %6, i32 100, i32 99" in the intermediate code; these statements expose the control flow of the con-ditional operator that cannot be conveyed by source codebased representations. Moreover, the iSeVC shown in Figure  4 (d) can identify that "N" in "N<m?N:99" (Line 14) takes the value "100" because of the corresponding intermediate code "%6=icmp slt i32 100, %5" and "%7=select i1 %6, i32 100, i32 99".
FINE-GRAINED VULNERABILITY DETECTION
Requirements for Fine-grained Vulnerability Detectors
We propose the following three requirements for neural network models that aim to detect and locate vulnerabilities. These requirements are centered at the novel idea of granularity refinement.
• Requirement 1: Granularity refinement. In order to pin down vulnerabilities, the granularity of the output of a neural network vulnerability detector should be finer than that of the input. • Requirement 3: Attention taking. Some parts of an iSeVC may be more important than others and thus should be paid more attention by a neural network; i.e., it should take advantage of the "attention" (i.e., more important parts) highlighted in an input.
Labeling iSeVCs
We label each iSeVC from training programs as follows: If an iSeVC contains a known vulnerability, the iSeVC is labeled with the line number(s) of the vulnerability in the iSeVC (i.e. location of the vulnerability), denoted by x 1 , . . . , x ζ where x (1 ≤ ≤ ζ) is a line number corresponding to the vulnerability; otherwise, the iSeVC is labeled as "0" (i.e., containing no vulnerability). Since a vulnerability dataset should provide the locations (e.g., line numbers) of vulnerabilities in the intermediate code of a source program, these line numbers of vulnerabilities in the source program need to be mapped to the line numbers in the intermediate code, which can be done simply by leveraging a textual LLVM file that comes with debugging information [31] .
Training a Neural Network Model
Each iSeVC needs to be encoded into a vector, which is used as an input to a neural network. In order to make iSeVCs independent of user-defined function names while capturing program semantic information, this step maps user-defined function names to symbolic names (e.g., "FUN1", "FUN2") in a one-to-one fashion. It is worth mentioning that iSeVCs are already independent of local variable names because the latter are replaced with symbolic names in the intermediate code. Then, a word embedding method can be used to encode iSeVCs into vectors. Since the lengths of the resulting vectors (representing iSeVCs) can be different and a neural network takes input vectors of a fixed-length θ, these vectors may need to be adjusted as follows: If a vector is shorter than θ, zeroes are padded to the end of the vector; if a vector is longer than θ, the vector is truncated to length θ to make the sSyVC appear in the middle of the resulting vector [18] . Finally, the vectors are used as the input to a neural network that satisfies the aforementioned Requirements 1-3 (i.e., granularity refinement, easy mapping, and attention taking). In what follows, we elaborate the neural network BRNN-vdl we propose, which satisfies the aforementioned Requirements 1-3.
BRNNs achieve easy mapping
One may suggest to use Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), such as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [32] , [33] , to achieve easy mapping. This seems reasonable because RNNs are effective in coping with sequential data and the output at each time step corresponds to a token in an iSeVC, which makes it easy to map the output back to iSeVCs. However, unidirectional RNNs are not sufficient because a statement in a program may be affected by some preceding and/or subsequent statements in the program. Nevertheless, BRNNs, such as Bidirectional LSTM (BLSTM) and Bidirectional GRU (BGRU) can indeed achieve easy mapping, while accommodating preceding and subsequent statements.
BRNNs cannot achieve the other two properties because their output granularity is the same as, rather than refining, the input granularity because they treat every part of an input equally. For vulnerability detection, some parts (i.e., vulnerable lines of code) of an iSeVC may be more important than the other parts of the iSeVC and should be paid more attention by neural networks. Figure 5 highlights the structure of BRNN-vdl, which extends the standard BRNN with three extra layers that formulate the "vdl" part to achieve granularity refinement and attention taking. The input to BRNN-vdl includes (i) the vectors that represent the iSeVCs, and (ii) a vulnerability location matrix that represents the locations of vulnerabilities in each vector. The learning phase outputs a BRNN-vdl with fine-tuned parameters. In what follows, we briefly review BRNN and then describe the three extra layers in BRNNvdl we introduce. Figure 5 , the standard BRNN has (i) a number of BRNN layers, which connect the RNN cells (e.g., LSTM and GRU) in both forward and backward directions, (ii) a dense layer, which reduces the number of dimensions of the vectors received from the BRNN layers, and (iii) an activation layer, which uses an activation function to generate the output at a time step. In the context of the present paper, the input is the vectors representing the labelled iSeVCs. Each time step corresponds to a token in an iSeVC. At time step τ , where 1 ≤ τ ≤ λ and λ is the number of tokens in ... Fig. 5 . BRNN-vdl extends BRNN with three extra layers (i.e., the multiply, κ-max pooling, and average pooling layers) that formulate the "vdl" part to achieve three desired properties.
BRNN-vdl: A novel variant of BRNN further achieving attention taking and granularity refinement
Overview of the BRNN component in BRNN-vdl. As shown in
each iSeVC, the output of the BRNN layers for iSeVC e i,j,k,z , denoted by g τ (e i,j,k,z ), is
where ω is a weight vector, β is a bias vector, g τ −1 (e i,j,k,z ) and g τ +1 (e i,j,k,z ) are respectively the output of the BRNN layers at time steps τ − 1 and τ + 1, and function φ indicates that the output of BRNN layers is represented by its parameters that include g τ −1 (e i,j,k,z ), g τ +1 (e i,j,k,z ), e i,j,k,z , ω, and β. How these parameters exactly interact with each other depends on the RNN cells, such as LSTM and GRU (see [32] , [33] for more information). For iSeVC e i,j,k,z , the output vector of the standard BRNN A i,j,k,z (i.e., the output vector of the activation layer) is denoted by A i,j,k,z = (g 1 (e i,j,k,z ), . . . , g λ (e i,j,k,z )).
(2)
The multiply layer achieves attention taking. For the iSeVCs that are vulnerable, the multiply layer is meant to select the outputs of the tokens that correspond to the vulnerable lines of code. These selected outputs will be used in the subsequent layers and the back propagation process of BRNN-vdl because they would help locate vulnerabilities with a higher precision (than not using this multiply layer).
For the iSeVCs that are not vulnerable, the multiply layer is meant to select all outputs of the tokens and use them in the subsequent layers and the back propagation process of BRNN-vdl, because these tokens are equally important as far as the learning phase is concerned. Formally, for iSeVC e i,j,k,z , the multiply layer multiplies the output vector of the activation layer A i,j,k,z with the vulnerability location matrix L i,j,k,z . The output vector of the multiply layer M i,j,k,z is denoted by
where L i,j,k,z is a diagonal matrix with L i,j,k,z = diag(α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α λ ). For a vulnerable iSeVC, let us denote by x the location of the first token in the vulnerable line x for some 1 ≤ ≤ ζ, and by w the number of tokens in x .
The value of α ϕ (1 ≤ ϕ ≤ λ) is determined as follows: For the iSeVCs that are vulnerable, if ϕ ∈ {x , . . . , x + w − 1}, then we set α ϕ = 1; otherwise, we set α ϕ = 0. For the iSeVCs that are not vulnerable, we set α ϕ = 1 for 1 ≤ ϕ ≤ λ. This design choice can be justified as follows: For each iSeVC that is not vulnerable, all tokens should be equally treated because no line of code is vulnerable. However, a vulnerable iSeVC contains (i) one or multiple vulnerable lines of code, which should be highlighted for vulnerability locating purposes, and (ii) possibly a large number of lines of code that are not vulnerable, which only provide the context for vulnerability detection. If all tokens in a vulnerable iSeVC are equally treated, a false-negative can occur because most lines of code are not vulnerable. The κ-max pooling layer and the average pooling layer together achieve granularity refinement. The κ-max pooling layer is meant to select the κ largest values among the elements in the output vector of the multiply layer M i,j,k,z .
The average pooling layer is meant to compute the average of the outputs of the κ-max pooling layer. Intuitively, these two layers together achieve granularity refinement because (i) they further select the outputs of the multiply layer to obtain the output corresponding to each iSeVC, which is used for back propagation, and (ii) they take into account both the maximum and the average. Formally, for an iSeVC e i,j,k,z , the output of average pooling layer o i,j,k,z is defined as
where function max κ returns the κ largest elements in the vector, and function ave returns the average of the κ largest elements. After conducting iterative forward and backward propagations, the training process converges to a BRNN-vdl with fine-tuned parameters, which encodes vulnerability patterns in the training data. Figure 6 highlights using the learned BRNN-vdl to detect and locate vulnerabilities in target programs. The input is the vectors representing the iSeVCs extracted from the target programs. For generating outputs, we first compute the average of the κ largest values for the tokens in each line. Then, we extract the lines whose output is larger than the threshold ϑ, leading to vulnerable iSeVCs and lines of code. Finally, we map these vulnerable lines of code to the vulnerable lines of source code as the output of the detection phase.
Detecting and Locating Vulnerabilities
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Our experiments use a machine with a NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 GPU and an Intel Xeon E5-1620 CPU operating at 3.50GHz.
Research Questions
We gear our experiments towards answering the following four Research Questions (RQs): • RQ2: Can BRNN-vdl achieve a substantially higher vulnerability locating precision than BRNN?
• RQ3: How effective and precise is VulDeeLocator in detecting and locating vulnerabilities of target programs with known ground truth?
• RQ4: How effective and precise is VulDeeLocator in detecting and locating vulnerabilities of realworld software products for which we do not know whether they contain vulnerabilities or not?
Evaluation Metrics
We propose using five standard metrics to measure the detection capability of a vulnerability detector (see, e.g., [34] 
, or the overall effectiveness. In order to evaluate the locating precision of a vulnerability detector, we propose using the standard Intersection over Union (IoU) metric with IoU = |U∩V| |U∪V| , where U is the set of truly vulnerable lines of code and V is the set of detected vulnerable lines of code [35] . Figure 7 illustrates the meaning of IoU with respect to one iSeVC; as highlighted by boxes, U contains 4 statements, V contains 3 statements, U ∩ V contains 2 statements (i.e., |U ∩ V | = 2), and U ∪ V contains 5 statements (i.e., |U ∪ V | = 5), leading to IoU = 2/5. Intuitively, IoU reflects the degree at which the detected vulnerable statements overlap with the truly vulnerable statements. The closer the IoU is to 1, the higher the locating precision.
Preparing the Input to VulDeeLocator
We collect the source code of C programs from two vulnerability sources: the NVD [25] and the Software Assur-
#Lines of overlap #Lines of union = 2 5 ... ance Reference Dataset (SARD) [36] . The programs collected from the NVD are accompanied by their diff files, which describe the difference between the programs before and after patching the vulnerabilities in question. The programs collected from the SARD are accompanied by labels, which indicate whether they are vulnerable or not. Note that SARD contains production, synthetic, and academic programs (i.e., test cases). We filter out the programs that cannot be compiled into the LLVM intermediate code. We also filter out those programs whose length is less than 500 lines of code, which are not so useful for our purposes because they are mainly simple synthetic programs that contain limited functionalities.
For training purpose, we collect 10,246 programs that may or may not be vulnerable, including 382 programs from the NVD and 9,864 from the SARD. The training set contains 11 types of vulnerabilities: CWE-20, CWE-78, CWE-119, CWE-121, CWE-122, CWE-124, CWE-126, CWE-127, CWE-134, CWE-189, and CWE-399, where each type is uniquely identified by a Common Weakness Enumeration IDentifier (CWE ID) [37] . For testing purpose, we randomly collect 2,561 programs from the SARD as the target programs with known ground truth, meaning an 80:20 ratio of training vs. testing data. The 2,561 programs involve (i) 2,038 programs containing 7 (of the 11) types of vulnerabilities mentioned above, and (ii) 523 programs containing 5 types of vulnerabilities (i.e., CWE-194, CWE-195, CWE-197, CWE-590, and CWE-690), which are however not contained in any of the training programs.
Intermediate Code-based Vulnerability Candidate
Extracting sSyVCs. In order to extract sSyVCs from the source code, we use Clang [29] to generate ASTs from a source program. Then, we traverse the ASTs to generate sSyVCs. For obtaining vulnerability syntax characteristics, we leverage the C vulnerability rules of the commercial tool Checkmarx [7] because we found that the syntax characteristics from these rules have a good coverage over known vulnerabilities. This leads to the four kinds of vulnerability syntax characteristics mentioned above, namely Library/API Function Call (FC), Array Definition (AD), Pointer Definition (PD), and Arithmetic Expression (AE). These characteristics cover 9,884 (i.e., 98.3%) of the vulnerable programs collected from the NVD and the SARD.
Take vulnerabilities of the FC-kind (i.e., Library/API function call) as an example, the syntax characteristic is that the type of a node on the AST in question is function call, the function name matches a library/API function name, and at least one argument of the function call is a variable. Given the ASTs of a source program, the matching algorithm proceeds as follows: (i) we first traverse the ASTs to identify the nodes whose type is "CxCursor CallExpr" (meaning a function call); (ii) identify the nodes whose token matches a library/API function name (e.g., memset); (iii) traverse the children of the node corresponding to a library/API function call to identify the nodes whose type is "CxCursor DeclRefExpr" (meaning a variable argument); and (iv) a library/API function call together with its variable arguments is extracted as a sSyVC. In total, we extract 119,782 sSyVCs, including 29,782 sSyVCs of the FC-kind, 29,273 sSyVCs of the AD-kind, 38,063 sSyVCs of the PDkind, and 22,664 sSyVCs of the AE-kind from the training programs. Generating iSeVCs. We use tool dg [30] to generate LLVMbased intermediate code slices corresponding to given source code sSyVCs as follows. For each given source code sSyVC, the corresponding iSeVC is a slice of intermediate code statements consisting of: (i) the intermediate code statements corresponding to the given source code sSyVC; and (ii) any intermediate code statement that has a datadependence or control-dependence with any of the variables that are used or defined in the given sSyVC. Note that the statements in (ii) may belong to different functions or files than the one to which the given sSyVC belongs. Take the sSyVC "data" (Line 2) in Figure 4 (a) as an example, the LLVM-based intermediate code slices (i.e., LLVM slices) corresponding to "data" generated by dg is described in Figure 4 (c). Then, we use Algorithm 1 to generate iSeVCs. In total, we extract 119,782 iSeVCs from training programs. The second column of Table 1 summarizes the number of iSeVCs in each kind of sSyVCs. 
Fine-grained Vulnerability Detection
Labeling iSeVCs. For the iSeVCs extracted from programs collected from NVD, we focus on the vulnerabilities that are accompanied by diff files that involve line deletion or line movement because they allow us to pin down the locations of these vulnerabilities (i.e., statements prefixed by "-" in a diff file). If (i) an iSeVC contains some intermediate code that corresponds to one or multiple statements prefixed by "-" in the diff file and (ii) the program in question contains a known vulnerability, then the iSeVC is labeled as the line number(s) of the vulnerability in the intermediate code; otherwise, the iSeVC is labeled as "0" (i.e., not vulnerable). For iSeVCs extracted from programs collected from the SARD, if an iSeVC contains some intermediate code that corresponds to one or multiple vulnerable statements in the source program, then the iSeVC is labeled as the line number(s) of the vulnerability in the intermediate code; otherwise, the iSeVC is labeled as "0" (i.e., not vulnerable). The third and fourth columns of Table 1 respectively list the numbers of vulnerable iSeVCs and non-vulnerable iSeVCs in each kind of sSyVCs.
Training, detecting and locating. In order to use neural networks, we need to encode iSeVCs into vectors. For this purpose, we first divide each iSeVC into a sequence of tokens via lexical analysis (e.g., "call", "void", "@", "FUN1", "(", and ")"), and then transform each token to a fixedlength vector via word2vec tool [38] . Finally, a token-level vector for each iSeVC is obtained by concatenating the token-level vectors in sequence. Each token is encoded into a vector of length 30, and each iSeVC is represented by a vector of length θ=27,000, which means that the first 900 tokens of an iSeVC are considered.
We implement the BRNN-vdl in Python using Tensor-Flow [39] together with Keras [40] . We use a 5-fold cross validation to train the BRNN-vdl and choose the parameter values that lead to the highest F1-measure. We implement two instances of BRNN: one is BLSTM, which leads to "VulDeeLocator-BLSTM"; the other is BGRU, which leads to "VulDeeLocator-BGRU". Take VulDeeLocator-BGRU as an example, the trained hyper-parameters are: output dimension is 512; the number of hidden layers is 2; the number of hidden nodes at each layer is 900; batch size is 16; minibatch stochastic gradient descent together with ADAMAX [41] is used; learning rate is 0.002; dropout is 0.4; the number of epochs is 10; and κ = 1.
For detecting vulnerabilities in target programs, we first compute the average of the κ largest values among the tokens in each line of intermediate code. Then, we extract the lines whose output is larger than threshold ϑ (e.g., 0.5). These lines of code are the vulnerable ones, and are mapped back to the vulnerable lines of source code as the output of the testing (i.e., detection) phase.
Experiments for Answering RQ1
In order to evaluate the advantages of intermediate codebased vulnerability candidate representation over source code-based one, we conduct experiments with the following two vulnerability candidate representations:
• source code-and Semantics-based Vulnerability Candidate (sSeVC): A sSeVC is a sequence of source code statements that have some data-dependence or control-dependence with a sSyVC (i.e., source code-and Syntax-based Vulnerability Candidate, as defined in Section 2.2) and can be obtained by using a source code static analysis tool (e.g., Joern [26] ).
• iSeVC: An iSeVC is a sequence of intermediate code statements that have some data-dependence or control-dependence with a sSyVC. Compared with source code-based representation, iSeVC is in the static single assignment (i.e., SSA) form, which assures that each variable is defined-and-then-used and is assigned exactly once.
We report the experimental results with VulDeeLocator-BGRU, while noting that experimental results with Vul-DeeLocator-BLSTM are similar. Table 2 summarizes the comparison. We observe that iSeVCs lead to better results than sSeVCs, including a 1.7% improvement in falsepositive rate, a 28.8% improvement in false-negative rate, a 9.9% improvement in accuracy, a 3.2% improvement in precision, and a 18.3% improvement in F1-measure. This can be attributed to the two advantages of intermediate codebased representation: (i) intermediate code is in the SSA form, which can expose more information about controlflows and the define-use relations between variables; (ii) intermediate code-based vulnerability candidates can capture more semantic information (e.g. the relations between the definitions of types or macros and their uses), which however may not be identified by sSeVCs. This is justified by the following two examples. Figure 8 (a) shows one example, which is dubbed test case 244486 because it is derived from the SARD dataset [36] . This example contains an OS command injection vulnerability because the input is received from the console and is used without validating it (vulnerable Line 23). Consider sSyVC "data" in Line 8. Since the source code parsing (e.g. when using Joern [26] ) cannot deal with macro definitions, "COMMAND ARG3" in Line 23 cannot be identified as "data". As a consequence, the corresponding sSeVC fails to identify the vulnerable statement in Line 23. This explains the false-negative. On the other hand, the iSeVCs can identify the "COMMAND ARG3" in Line 23 as "data" after compilation. This explains why the resulting model can detect the vulnerability. Figure 8 (b) shows another example, dubbed test case 234895. The example contains a buffer under-read vulnerability because the copy from a memory location may be located before the source buffer (vulnerable Line 10). Consider sSyVC "data" in Line 6. Since the source code parsing (e.g. when using Joern [26] ) cannot deal with global variables, the sSeVC corresponding to sSyVC "data" in Line 6 does not contain the statements that are semantically related to sSyVC "data" via the global variable CWE127 Buffer Underread malloc char memcpy 45 badData in function CWE127 Buffer Underread malloc char memcpy 45 bad. The root cause of the vulnerability is that the data pointer points to a memory address that is different from the allocated memory buffer (Line 22), which is defined in function CWE127 Buffer Underread malloc char memcpy 45 bad. This explains why the vulnerability is missed. However, the model learned from iSeVCs can identify and accommodate these statements because they are semantically related to the global variable. In summary, we answer RQ1 with the following: Insight 1.
VulDeeLocator leveraging intermediate code-based representation is substantially more effective than VulDee-Locator using source code-based representation, owing to the aforementioned two advantages of intermediate code-based representation.
Experiments for Answering RQ2
In order to see the capability of BRNN-vdl in locating vulnerabilities, we conduct experiments to compare BRNNvdl and BRNN while using two types of vulnerability candidates (i.e., source code-based sSeVCs vs. intermediate code-based iSeVCs as specified in Section 6.6). In what follows, we report the experimental results of using BGRU to instantiate BRNN, while noting that similar results are observed when using BLSTM to instantiate BRNN. Table 3 presents the comparison. For locating vulnerabilities, BRNN-vdl achieves, on average, a 22.6% higher IoU than BRNN because the number of detected vulnerable lines of code is 2.8 for BRNN-vdl and 17.4 for BRNN on average. This can be explained by the fact that BRNN preserves the input granularity in its output, while BRNN-vdl reduces the input lines of code to much smaller lines of code in its output. This "granularity refinement" is accomplished by the "vdl" part. In terms of vulnerability detection capability, BRNN-vdl is better than BRNN, with a 6.2% lower falsepositive rate and a 1.2% higher F1-measure at the price of a 4.7% higher false-negative rate when using sSeVCs as vulnerability candidates, and with a 1.8% lower falsepositive rate, a 1.4% false-negative rate, and a 3.7% higher F1-measure when using iSeVCs as vulnerability candidates. This means that "vdl" can somewhat improve the vulnerability detection capability. This leads to: Insight 2. BRNN-vdl achieves a substantially higher vulnerability locating precision and a somewhat higher vulnerability detection capability than BRNN.
Experiments for Answering RQ3
In order to answer RQ3, we compare two instances of VulDeeLocator and some state-of-the-art vulnerability detectors in terms of their capabilities in detecting and locating vulnerabilities in target programs with known ground truth.
6.8.1
Comparing VulDeeLocators with two instances of BRNN (i.e., BLSTM vs. BGRU) Table 4 highlights the experimental results. We observe that VulDeeLocator-BGRU simultaneously achieves a 3.8% lower false-negative rate, a 1.8% higher F1-measure, and a 5.6% higher IoU than VulDeeLocator-BLSTM. The higher locating precision may be attributed to the fact that BGRU uses fewer parameters, possibly making it easier to "refine" the output. VulDeeLocator-BGRU detects all of the vulnerabilities in the 2,484 (of the 2,561) target programs, despite that 5 types of detected vulnerabilities did not appear in the training data. This justifies that pattern-based detector indeed can detect some, but not all (as elaborated below), vulnerabilities that are not in the training data. However, there are indeed false-negatives, which can be caused by inadequate coverage of vulnerability syntax characteristics and vulnerability types in the training data. For example, 19 false-negatives of VulDeeLocator-BGRU are not covered by the four kinds of vulnerability syntax characteristics, highlighting the importance of identifying as-complete-aspossible vulnerability syntax characteristics. Moreover, another 56 false-negatives of VulDeeLocator-BGRU are caused by the fact that their corresponding vulnerability types do not appear in the training data. For source code-and rule-based vulnerability detectors, we consider the open source tool Flawfinder [6] and the commercial product Checkmarx [7] . For intermediate codeand rule-based vulnerability detectors, we consider the commercial product Fortify [8] . For deep learning-based vulnerability detectors, we consider VulDeePecker [17] , which is designed to detect vulnerabilities related to library/API function calls, and SySeVR [18] , which is designed to detect multiple types of vulnerabilities. The implementations of these two tools are obtained from their authors (via private communications). We choose these systems for comparison because they are the state-of-the-art and/or available to us. Table 4 summarizes the comparison. We make the following observations. (i) Source code-and rule-based vulnerability detector Flawfinder incurs prohibitively high false-negative rate, which can be attributed to the inadequacy of its parser and patterns [42] . (ii) Source codeand rule-based vulnerability detector Checkmarx incurs prohibitively high false-positive rate and false-negative rate, which can be attributed to the inadequacy of the rules defined by human experts. This justifies why we only use the Checkmarx rules to extract sSyVCs as a starting point for vulnerability detection. (iii) Intermediate code-and rule-based vulnerability detector Fortify incurs very high false-positive rate and false-negative rate, suggesting that rules based on intermediate code can indeed accommodate more useful information than rules based on source code. (iv) Deep learning-based detector VulDeePecker is much less effective than deep learning-based SySeVR because the former can only cope with the class of vulnerabilities related to library/API function calls [17] , but SySeVR can cope with multiple classes of vulnerabilities [18] . (v) VulDeeLocator-BGRU achieves respectively an 11.0%, 9.6%, and 8.2% improvement over SySeVR in F1-measure, falsepositive rate, and false-negative rate, because the former can accommodate more semantic information conveyed by intermediate code. for SySeVR. The higher vulnerability locating precision can be attributed to the vdl-part of BRNN-vdl. In summary, we draw: Insight 4. VulDeeLocator is more effective than the state-of-the-art pattern-based vulnerability detectors in detecting and locating vulnerabilities. In particular, VulDeeLocator-BGRU achieves a 3.9X higher locating precision than the state-of-the-art vulnerability detector SySeVR.
Experiments for Answering RQ4
In order to answer RQ4, we apply VulDeeLocator-BGRU, which is the most effective instance of VulDeeLocator, to detect vulnerabilities in several versions of 3 software products (i.e., Linux kernel, FFmpeg, and Libav). Since we do not know whether these products contain vulnerabilities or not (i.e., the ground truth is not known), we select 200 program files of these software products as the test data, and manually examine and confirm the vulnerabilities detected from them. VulDeeLocator detects 16 vulnerabilities from these 200 program files, including 5 false positives. Among the 11 true positives, 7 vulnerabilities correspond to known vulnerabilities as shown in Table 5 , but the other 4 vulnerabilities are not reported in the NVD as shown in Figure 9 presents an example of vulnerability that is detected by VulDeeLocator-BGRU but missed by VulDeePecker [17] and SySeVR [18] in software product FFmpeg 0.9.4. This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2011-3934 and is related to double free because the statement in Line 11 can cause a double release of variable "s → current f rame". Consider sSyVC "s" in Line 3. Since the source code parsing (e.g. when using Joern [26] ) cannot deal with macro definitions, "copy f ields(s, s1, golden f rame, current f rame)" in Line 11 cannot be identified as "memcpy(&s → golden f rame, &s1 → golden f rame, (char * )&s → current f rame -(char * )&s → golden f rame)", meaning that the source code-based representation cannot identify the vulnerable statement in Line 11. This explains the false-negative of VulDeePecker and SySeVR. On the other hand, the iSeVC can convert the statement in Line 11 to "memcpy(&s → golden f rame, &s1 → golden f rame, (char * )&s → current f rame -(char * )&s → golden f rame);". This explains why VulDee-Locator can detect the vulnerability. Table 6 highlights the four vulnerabilities detected by VulDeeLocator-BGRU that are not reported in the NVD. These vulnerabilities are caused by improper use of pointers and allow remote attackers to wage denial-of-service attacks. Specifically, the first vulnerability is caused by the lack of checking on memory allocation; the second and third ones are caused by the lack of properly validating the reduction factor or block length; the fourth one is caused by use-afterfree. Among the four vulnerabilities mentioned above, three in Libav 10.3 are not known to exist until now and are confirmed by our manual examination. For ethical exposure purposes, we anonymize their vulnerable files but have reported the details to the vendor. The other vulnerability in Libav 9.10 is a use-after-free vulnerability related to a pointer named "tracks"; this vulnerability is not reported in the NVD but has been "silently" patched by the vendor when releasing newer versions of the product (with the first patched version being Libav 9.18). In summary, we draw: ... 20 #undef copy_fields 21 } 22 upd ate_frames(dst); 23 retu rn 0; 24 } Fig. 9 . The vulnerability detected by VulDeeLocator but not detected by any of VulDeePecker and SySeVR.
LIMITATIONS
This study has several limitations. First, the design of VulDeeLocator focuses on detecting vulnerabilities in C source programs because (i) we want to demonstrate the feasibility of VulDeeLocator and (ii) the tools we leverage happen to support C. Extending VulDeeLocator to accommodate other programming languages is an interesting future work. Second, VulDeeLocator requires to compile program source code into intermediate code, and cannot be used when a program source code cannot be compiled. Third, the four kinds of vulnerability syntax characteristics used by VulDeeLocator can cover 98.3% of vulnerable programs collected from NVD and SARD. This 98.3% coverage should be used with caution because (i) for the NVD data, we only use the lines of code that are deleted or moved in a diff file as the location of a vulnerability (i.e., we did not consider those vulnerabilities whose diff files only involve line additions), and (ii) the SARD data may not be representative of realworld software products. It is an open problem to identify more complete vulnerability syntax characteristics. Fourth, our case study uses BRNN-vdl to instantiate VulDeeLocator to demonstrate feasibility. Tailored neural networks need to be designed for vulnerability detection purposes. Fifth, we can partly explain the effectiveness of VulDeeLocator, but much more research needs to be done in this direction of explainability.
RELATED WORK
Prior work on static vulnerability detection. The present study belongs to static vulnerability detection, which includes code similarity-based methods and pattern-based methods. Code similarity-based methods [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] can achieve a high locating precision when they indeed detect vulnerabilities, but have a high false-negative rate because many vulnerabilities are not caused by code cloning [17] . Pattern-based vulnerability detection methods can be further divided into rule-based ones and machine learning-based ones. Rule-based methods use analyst-generated rules to detect vulnerabilities, including (i) open source tools (e.g., Flawfinder [6] ) and commercial tools (e.g., Checkmarx [7] ), which operate on program source code, and (ii) Fortify and Coverity [8] , [9] , which operate on intermediate code. These tools have high false-positives or false-negatives [42] . Machine learning-based methods aim to detect vulnerabilities using patterns learned from analyst-defined feature representations of vulnerabilities [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [24] or "raw" feature representations via deep learning [19] , [20] , [21] , [17] , [18] , [43] . These methods detect vulnerabilities at coarse granularities (e.g., programs [14] , components [13] , functions [12] , [19] , [21] , [43] , and code gadgets [17] , [18] ).
Among the detectors mentioned above, VulDeePecker [17] and SySeVR [18] are closely related to ours. However, these two detectors operate on program slices and source code-based vulnerability candidates. To the best of our knowledge, VulDeeLocator is the first deep learning-based detector that uses intermediate code-based vulnerability candidates to accommodate semantic information and uses granularity refinement to achieve a high locating precision. Prior work on dynamic vulnerability detection. Dynamic vulnerability detection, including dynamic symbolic execution [44] , [45] and fuzzing [46] , [47] , is complementary to static vulnerability detection and is often used to detect vulnerabilities in binary code. These methods explore program execution paths to identify the inputs that make the program exhibit unsafe operations (e.g., crashing). These methods can determine whether or not a program has a bug or vulnerability, but cannot precisely locate the vulnerability. In contrast, VulDeeLocator not only can detect vulnerabilities but also can pin down the locations of vulnerabilities, partly owing to the availability of program source code and intermediate code.
Prior work on bug detection. Since vulnerabilities can be seen as a special kind of bugs [48] , we briefly review prior studies on bug detectors. Similar to vulnerability detection, there are two detection methods: static vs. dynamic. Static methods often use information retrieval techniques together with bug reports to detect bugs in source code (e.g., [49] , [50] ). Dynamic methods include: spectrum-based methods [51] , which examine pass-and-fail execution traces to determine whether or not a line of source code has a bug; mutation-based methods [52] , [53] , which consider whether or not the execution of a line of code affects the result of a test case. However, bug detection methods cannot be used to detect vulnerabilities because (i) bugs are not necessarily vulnerabilities and (ii) bug detection methods often rely on bug reports or test cases.
CONCLUSION
We presented VulDeeLocator, the first deep learning-based fine-grained vulnerability detector that can simultaneously achieve a high detection capability and a high locating precision. It achieves these by leveraging intermediate code to capture semantic information that cannot be conveyed by source code-based representations and the new idea of granularity refinement. As one application, VulDeeLocator detected four vulnerabilities that were not reported in the NVD. The limitations of the present study offer interesting open problems for future research.
